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青岛希尼尔翻译咨询有限公司(www.joshualeeproperties.com)整理发布  2015-11-11


青岛希尼尔翻译公司(www.joshualeeproperties.com)2015年11月11日了解到:“没有任何力量能把我们分开。我们是……血浓于水的一家人!闭馐窍敖皆诔晌泄舐绞孜挥胩ㄍ遄芡澄帐值墓抑飨笏倒幕。习近平与马英九的会面无疑具有历史意义。然而,习近平谈到的“一家人”让我想起好莱坞电影中黑手党老大用到这个词时的情景:既富有魅力又暗含威胁。事实是,中国大陆仍坚称,台湾是一个叛离省份,并保留一旦台湾宣布独立将展开攻击的权利。Nothing can separate us. We are one family”. So said Xi Jinping after becoming the first president of China to shake hands with a president of Taiwan. The meeting between Mr Xi and Ma Ying-jeou was undoubtedly historic. And yet Mr Xi’s talk of “family” reminded me of the way that a Hollywood mafia don might use the term — in a manner that mixes charm with menace. The fact is that Beijing still insists that Taiwan is a rebel province and reserves the right to attack its family member should Taiwan ever declare independence.

The ambiguities do not end there. On one level, Mr Xi’s decision to break with decades of ostracism was the act of a confident leader. Yet the Chinese president’s boldness probably reflects anxiety as much as confidence. For when he looks out at China’s near abroad he confronts a sea of troubles. 这种模糊并不只表现在这里。从一个层面来看,习近平决定打破两岸几十年的相互排斥是一位自信领导人的做法。然而,习近平的勇敢或许既反映出了信心,也显示出了担忧。因为当他向一衣带水的对岸望去时,看到的是一片充满麻烦的海洋。

The politics of Taiwan are moving against China. Beijing is also under increased pressure from the US over its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. Mr Xi has troubles on dry land, too. America and 11 other nations have just agreed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement that excludes China, challenging its central position in the economy of the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2014 have left a legacy of bitterness with the mainland, raising the prospect that Beijing’s “One China” policy could be challenged in Hong Kong and Taiwan simultaneously. 台湾政治正朝着对大陆不利的方向发展。此外,中国大陆在南中国海的领土抱负问题上正面临美国越来越大的压力。习近平在陆上也面临麻烦。美国和11个其他国家刚刚就《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)达成一致,这一贸易协议并不包括中国,对中国在亚太经济中的中心地位形成挑战。与此同时,香港2014年的民主抗议令其与中国内地交恶,北京方面的“一个中国”政策有可能会同时在香港和台湾受到挑战。

What is more, all this is taking place against the background of a slowing domestic economy, see-sawing stock markets and a Chinese elite that has been deeply destabilised by Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. 另外,这一切都发生在中国国内经济放缓、股市剧烈波动的背景之下,同时习近平的反腐运动深深撼动了中国精英阶层。

Given all these other problems, the last thing the president needs is a new Taiwan crisis. His decision to meet Mr Ma comes two months before a presidential election in Taiwan, which is likely to result in a victory for Tsai Ing-wen, the leader of the independence-minded Democratic Progressive party (DPP), a group abhorred by the Chinese government. Friday’s handshake looks like an attempt by Mr Xi to boost Mr Ma’s Kuomintang party (KMT). But the DPP is so far ahead in the polls that the gambit is likely to fail. 鉴于所有这些其他问题,习近平最不想看到的就是台湾爆发新的;。他是在台湾总统大选开始两个月前做出会面决定的。民进党(DPP)主席蔡英文(Tsai Ing-wen)可能会赢得台湾总统大选。而民进党支持台独,受到大陆政府的厌恶。上周六两岸领导人的握手看上去像是习近平试图提振马英九所在的国民党(KMT)的人气。但民进党在民调中遥遥领先,这一步棋可能会失败。

If the DPP wins power and is too explicit in its rejection of Beijing, Mr Xi may feel compelled to resort to more threatening language. That, in turn, would ratchet up security tension with the US at a time when there is already a mini-crisis in the South China Sea. 如果民进党掌权,而且过于明显地排斥大陆,习近平或许会认为有必要使用更具威胁性的措辞。而这将进一步加剧与美国的安全紧张关系,此际中美在南中国海已发生一次小;。

During the most recent Taiwan Strait crisis, from 1995 to 1996, the US sent an aircraft carrier to the region, in response to China’s military intimidation of the Taiwanese. Since then, Beijing has adopted much subtler tactics, relying on burgeoning economic and travel ties to draw the “rebel province” gradually back into its orbit. The election of a pro-independence president in Taiwan would suggest these tactics had failed. 在1995年至1996年最近一次台湾海峡;诩,美国曾向该地区派遣一艘航空母舰,以回应大陆对台湾的军事恐吓。此后,大陆一直实行较为微妙的策略,依赖日益增强的经济和旅游纽带,将这个“叛离省份”逐渐重新纳入其轨道。如果台湾选出一位支持台独的总统,将意味着上述策略已告败。

In the past 20 years, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has probably tilted towards Beijing but it would be a bold Chinese president who put this proposition to the test. 在过去20年里,台湾海峡的军事平衡可能已经向北京方面倾斜,但只有胆大的中国国家主席才敢将这一命题付诸检验。

In all this jostling for influence, China’s strongest card remains the power of its economy. Almost all the nations of Southeast Asia do considerably more trade with China than with the US. But that makes the TPP potentially threatening to China. 在所有这些影响力争夺战中,中国的王牌依然是其经济实力。几乎所有东南亚国家与中国的贸易都远远超过与美国的贸易,但这也让TPP对中国造成潜在威胁。

Some Chinese analysts have even called the TPP “an economic Nato”, since they see it as an alliance aimed explicitly at isolating China. America says that eventual Chinese membership remains a possibility. And it is clear that many of the signatories of the TPP, including Singapore and New Zealand, would genuinely like China to join the new trade bloc. They do not like the economic or the political implications of excluding Beijing. 一些中国分析师甚至将TPP称为“经济北约”,因为他们认为,这是一个明显旨在孤立中国的联盟。美国表示,中国最终加入TPP依然是有可能的。TPP的许多签约国(包括新加坡和新西兰)显然会真心实意地希望中国加入这个新的贸易集团。他们不喜欢将中国排除在外带来的经济或政治影响。

But the two biggest signatories of 但美国和日本这两个最大的TPP签约国的疑虑更大一些。TPP的一些条款,比如在劳动力和环境;しㄒ约巴缈占浞矫娴某信,可能设计得让中国难以加入。

the pact, the US and Japan, are more sceptical. Some of the provisions of the TPP, such as commitments on labour and environmental law, and on cyber space, might have been designed to make it hard for China to join. 在不断上升的成本侵蚀中国竞争力之际,长期被排除在TPP之外可能让中国作为生产基地的吸引力下降。

Long-term exclusion from the TPP could make China less attractive as a production base, just at the time when rising costs are eroding the country’s competitiveness. 南中国海和TPP等问题无论对中国政府来说多么困难,至少在很大程度上与政府政策有关。香港和台湾的问题则更加不可预测,因此也更危险,因为它们包含北京方面控制不了的东西:舆论。

Issues such as the South China Sea and the TPP — however difficult for Beijing — are, at least, largely about government policy. The questions of Hong Kong and Taiwan are more unpredict-able, and therefore dangerous, because they involve something Beijing cannot control: public opinion. 无论在香港还是在台湾,越来越多的证据表明,年轻人对北京的法令越来越不愿尊重。作为中国一部分的香港,在2014年爆发过要求自由选举的“雨伞运动”。台湾去年也爆发了抗议与大陆签署的新贸易协议的“太阳花运动”。

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, there is growing evidence that the young are less and less inclined to treat Beijing’s edicts with respect. Hong Kong, which is now part of China, had its “umbrella” movement in 2014, demanding free elections. Taiwan has the “sunflower” movement, which also rose up last year in protest over a new trade agreement with China. 这些对习近平来说都是极端棘手的问题,但也是北京自己造成的问题。中国政府如此顽固地坚持陈旧的程式化政治用语,比如“叛离省份”和“一国两制”,把自己逼到了墙角。

These are fiercely difficult problems for Mr Xi. But they are also problems of Beijing’s own making. By insisting with such ferocity on stale political formulas, such as “rebel province” and “one country, two systems”, the Chinese government has boxed itself into a corner. 与马英九会面有力地体现了习近平的灵活性。但如果习近平真的希望让他的麻烦之海平静下来,他就需要从实质上改变北京对待台湾和香港的方式。

Meeting the president of Taiwan is a powerful symbol of flexibility. But if Mr Xi really wants to calm his sea of troubles, he needs to change the substance of Beijing’s approach to Taiwan and Hong Kong.



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